Public Values in Governance Networks: Management Approaches and Social Policy Tools in Local Community and Economic Development

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Abstract

The contextual nature of management approaches is important for understanding administrative centrality in governance networks in the public values process. This is of particular concern in a policy domain such as community development, which is characterized by the extensive involvement of nongovernmental actors in determining what ought to be done as well as carrying out those objectives. Using qualitative data, I explore the management approaches and policy tools used to fulfill Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) objectives in two different management contexts to analyze administrative centrality in governance networks in the public values process. Two different approaches emerge, suggesting different administrative trajectories to public values authorization and creation. Furthermore, the findings suggest that administrative centrality in the public values process may be influenced by the management context in which local agencies are embedded.

Keywords

public values, governance networks, community development

Introduction

Public values and governance networks have emerged as increasingly important topics as related to public management contexts. If public management approaches are indeed contextual, there are plausible implications on public values authorization and creation, particularly in decentralized policy environments. Furthermore, if this is the case, it is plausible that local administrative agencies adopt different approaches to manage governance networks, despite federal efforts to steer action. The purpose of this multisite case study is to describe administrative centrality in the public values process by exploring the management approaches adopted to administer the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program in two different political contexts. The primary question of interest in this article is as follows: What are the implications of different management approaches on public values authorization and creation in community development

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governance networks? Specific subquestions include the following: Do the management approaches adopted by a local agency influence differences in administrative centrality in governance networks? If so, do the values aligned with a particular management approach reinforce the political context in which it is embedded? Finally, what are the implications for the public values process?

Three central arguments are presented: First, the management approach adopted by an administrative agency may align with a particular management paradigm, traditional, new public management or public values management, in which assumptions about administrative centrality in public values authorization and creation vary. Second, management approaches are embedded in political contexts, referred to in this article as management contexts, and these contexts influence the dominant management paradigm adopted by an administrative agency. Finally, despite federal level rules and guidelines governing local programs, different management approaches yield governance networks with more or less administrative centrality in the authorization and creation of public value.

Before proceeding, a few definitions are necessary. In this article, public values authorization is considered a distinct activity from the creation of public value. Taken together, public values authorization and creation constitute the public values process. *Public values authorization* is defined as the process governing the decision of what ought to be provided by the public sector, what is publicly valuable, and how value is realized in the public interest. Conversely, *public values creation* concerns itself with the actions and processes local agencies take to create public value. Management approaches are defined as the processes and actions taken by local community development agencies to administer the CDBG program. Administrative centrality is defined as the use of direct and coercive policy tools by local agencies to guide governance networks, which are defined broadly as those public, nonprofit, and for-profit actors responsible for community development. Finally, management contexts are defined as the political systems in which management approaches are embedded.

Considering the link between management approaches and the public values process is of particular importance in an era where networked governance leaves a number of important questions unanswered. A central question in network studies is the extent to which administrative agencies maintain some centrality in the governance network. Governance networks can be conceptualized on a continuum compared with hierarchies, meaning that hierarchies are those more stable, predictable forms of organizations where the public sector has a more central and direct role, and networks are anything else that moves away from that stability (O'Toole & Meier, 1999). The centrality of administrative agencies in the governance network is an important consideration because as centrality diminishes, the likelihood of uncertainty of action increases (Koliba, Meek, & Zia, 2011; O'Toole & Meier, 1999), and, as Hula and Jackson-Elmoore (2001) found, the ability of nonprofit and other nongovernmental actors to govern effectively may be limited in the absence of some public authority.

Questions that are important include whether or not what networks do represents the public interest (Berry et al., 2004) and the role of administrative agencies in networks. Such questions are complex as networks function not only to inform what it is that government ought to do (authorization) but also to carry out the public will effectively and efficiently (creation). In this article, public values authorization is distinguished from public value creation to isolate administrative centrality in the governance networks responsible for each stage.

Within the public management literature, a few studies address the contextual nature of networks as a whole (Agranoff, 2007; Agranoff & McGuire, 1998; Berry et al., 2004; Meier & O'Toole, 2001; Provan & Milward, 2001), but as Berry et al. (2004) suggested, more empirical evidence is needed on the relationship between democratic governance, networks, and management approaches. Network arrangements can grant more power to nongovernmental organizations to authorize and create public value, but as Koliba et al. (2011) and O'Toole and Meier

(1999) suggest, public agencies can still play a central role in guiding network action. For example, network studies that focus on agency use of performance information to align networks to achieve public objectives provide some insights (Koliba et al., 2011). However, more remains to be known as to how administrative agencies maintain centrality in the process of public values authorization. Furthermore, as Rainey (1989) suggested, it is plausible that management approaches may differ based on contextual or environmental influences.

To address the research questions and the existing gaps, this article deviates from individual or single organizational level analyses of studying public values to an analysis of the public values process in community development networks. To these ends, a multisite case study of CDBG program administration is used to describe management approaches in different contexts and explain centrality of local agencies in the public values process. The local community development agencies in Cleveland, Ohio, and St. Louis, Missouri, are selected for the analysis because of similarities in political structures and socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the cities but differences in the political context in which they operate. The advantage of using a multi-case study approach is that it allows for an exploration of how a decentralized federal level program, despite uniform rules and guidelines, may yield differences in administrative centrality in the public values process.

The findings suggest that some local agencies emphasize centrality in creating public value, whereas others emphasize centrality in both the authorization and creation of public value. More importantly, the findings suggest, despite federal rules and guidelines encouraging agency centrality in both stages, the ability of administrative agencies to do this may be bound by the management context. Although the article has significance for the field of public management as it reinforces previous findings that suggest management approaches are contextual and subject to external forces (Bevir, Rhodes, & Weller, 2003; Rainey, 1989), perhaps more importantly, it extends this to understand the consequences of management approaches on the public values process. In this particular analysis, the results caution that approaches adopted in certain political contexts, by emphasizing one stage of the process over the other, may reproduce or generate power imbalances or inequalities. In the sections that follow, I provide an overview of the key literature, methods and data, and results and conclude with the study limitations and implications.

Public Values Authorization and Creation

Public values have been addressed and understood largely from the individual and organizational level (Bozeman, 2007; van der Wal, de Graaf, & Lasthuizen, 2008); however, in this analysis, the attention shifts away from the values held by individual administrators toward the values embedded in the management approach to accomplish program objectives. Values for government can be defined as an appraisal of what is created by government on behalf of the public. Definitions of public values range from a broad definition focused on the normative consensus that emerges in a particular governance context about the rights, benefits, and prerogatives to which citizens are entitled; the obligations of citizens to each other, the society, and the state; and the principles on which government policies may be based (Bozeman, 2007, in Nabatchi, 2012) to a narrower definition as offered by Andersen, Beck Jørgensen, Kjeldsen, Pedersen, and Vrangbæk (2013) that situates public values as an identified set of principles that serve as a precursor to administrative and policy action in a particular context. Benington and Moore (2011) suggest that the set of principles that inform the strategies pursued by administrative agents cannot be assumed but, rather, emerge out of the broader authorizing environment, "conceptualized as a place of contestation where many different views and values struggle for acceptance and hegemony" (p. 6). In this article, values are not conceptualized as something uniquely held by administrators, but administrative agencies are conceptualized as adopting management approaches in which

particular values are embedded, which influences administrative centrality in public values authorization and creation.

Public values and public value are distinguished from each other based on their relationship with authorization and creation. Public values authorization is defined as decisions about what development objectives should be, that is, what is valued by the local community. Administrative agencies can maintain centrality in the authorization stage through processes to ensure the cultivation and identification of particular values among a variety of network actors. Public value creation concerns what is produced or delivered by the public sector. Administrative agencies can maintain centrality in public value creation through the use of monitoring practices and processes to ensure programs adhere to federal guidelines.

The Public Values Process and the CDBG Program

The general case under study is local administration of the CDBG program. The CDBG program is the primary source of federal funds for community and economic development in the United States and provides annual grants to 1,209 general units of local government and states (Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD], 2013). As indicated on the HUD website, the CDBG program is "a flexible program that provides communities with resources to address a wide range of unique community development needs." In the early years of the CDBG program, only a few nonprofit organizations were recipients of funds to carry out community development activities; however, as programs and grantees proliferated, local governments increasingly began to rely on nonprofits or other external actors to carry out particular community development objectives.

Under federal guidelines, agencies responsible for allocating CDBG funds have a responsibility to facilitate the participation of low- and moderate-income residents and communities to participate in the planning, implementation, and assessment of the programs and projects and monitoring and maintaining oversight of subrecipients to ensure proper management (HUD, 2013). Under Section 104(a)(2) of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 and by regulations at 24 CFR 570.486(a)(6), agencies are required to at least hold two public hearings, advertise these hearings in newspapers, make accommodations for disabled or non-English speaking residents, notify residents of the meetings, and document these results. Local administrative agencies are also responsible for monitoring the program to ensure program effectiveness and efficiency, that is, the creation of public value (CFR, Title 24, 1, Part 85, 2006). Thus, federal guidelines require that local level agencies play a central role in both the authorization and creation of public values.

Put more simply, authorization concerns the action and processes that local level agencies adopt to facilitate decisions concerning what the public authorizes CDBG programs should do. For example, administrative agencies can maintain centrality through the use of regulations to ensure representative participation in the process, being directly engaged in the participation process by dedicating agency resources to these efforts, providing public information, and developing regulations governing the overall CDBG process. Conversely, public value creation concerns what is produced or delivered from CDBG allocations and the role of local agencies in facilitating, monitoring, or directly creating public value. Agencies can maintain centrality in the creation of public value through the use of direct and coercive policy tools to accomplish CDBG program objectives, or they can maintain centrality by coupling rules and regulations with grants to other nonprofit or for-profit organizations. However, questions remain as to the relationship between the values embedded in an agency's management approach and administrative centrality in different stages of the public values process.

Table 1. Management Paradigms.

Traditional Management	New public management	Public values management
Primary objectives		
Politically provided inputs and agency monitoring through bureaucratic oversight	Managing inputs and outputs in a way that ensures economy and responsiveness to consumers	Achieving public value that involves greater effectiveness in tackling the problems important to the public system building and maintenance
What the democratic process contributes		
Accountability: Competition between elected leaders provides accountability	*Objectives*: Limited to setting objectives and checking performance	*Ongoing dialogue*: Internal to all that is undertaken, a rolling and continuous process of democratic exchange is essential
What administrative agencies emphasize		
Rules and Regulations	Performance Metrics	Facilitation of Relationships
Monitoring and Compliance	Efficient Means	Multiple Mechanisms to Ensure Participation, Deliberation, Efficiency, and Effectiveness
	Customer Feedback	

Source. Adopted from Stoker (2006, p. 44).

Management Approaches and the Public Values Process

According to Stoker (2006), management approaches can be classified along traditional, new public management or public values paradigms, and that in a given context, one approach might be dominant over another. Table 1 depicts the predominant characteristics of different management approaches. Stoker (2006) argued that the management approach used in a given context might resemble one of these three dominant paradigms, identifiable by a predominant set of management actions. Emphasis in this article is placed on the actions taken by administrative agencies to manage the major community development influencers engaged in public values authorization and creation (Stein, 1991; Thompson, 1967). External influencers are defined as those formal or informal political influencers who play a pivotal role in authorizing public values through the democratic process.

A traditional management approach emphasizes the use of rules and regulations, and monitoring and compliance mechanisms to satisfy their major external influencers, which are elected political officials or federal authorities. Agencies respond through the adoption of practices that emphasize compliance with externally determined rules and requirements, enacting rules and regulations as necessary (Sandifort, 2000; Wilson, 1989). A new public management approach emphasizes the use of performance measures and metrics, as it assumes satisfying user needs in an efficient and proven way is instrumental to obtaining agency goals (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; Sandifort, 2000). Citizens as consumers, elites such as agency experts, and politicians serve as major external influencers. Finally, a public values management approach emphasizes the use of multiple mechanisms to allow the system to continually evolve and survive, and responds to a variety of external influencers, including elected officials, nongovernmental actors, and citizens (Stoker, 2006). In this approach, administrative agencies use a mixture of coordinating mechanisms including competition, rules, and regulations, to not only expand participation in the authorization process but also ensure public value creation.

Different management paradigms assume different relationships between administrative agencies and the public values process. In traditional management approaches, authorization is

realized through traditional policy channels—hence, the trajectory to realizing public interest is through the participation by groups and citizens in the formal political process, elected officials have a greater responsibility in authorizing public values, and the procedural democratic process provides accountability through competition among elected officials to ensure the public interest. Agencies focus more squarely on the use of rules, regulations, and monitoring techniques to ensure the creation of public value in line with what was authorized, so the public can make future decisions.

In new public management approaches, the authorization of public values results through individuals expressing their needs and wants to elected officials and administrative entities, and through the democratic process, agency objectives for action are formulated. Agency administrators function as experts, identifying the means to achieve these values efficiently to create public value, again, so the public can make future decisions about the value of what elected officials authorized.

In both traditional and new public management approaches, a greater emphasis is placed on the procedural notions of the democratic process, rooted in formal elected officials, shifting the focus of administrators' actions to the creation of that value rather than the authorization stage. However, in public values management approaches, politics is brought into the center of administrative actions, and the emphasis on building participatory democratic institutions increases. In this approach, the democratic process contributes ongoing dialogue, and the trajectory to realizing public interest is through the ongoing involvement and deliberation between elected officials, nongovernmental actors, and citizens. Agencies use different mechanisms to manage these relationships and do so by building a system of exchange that empowers and encourages ongoing interactions to facilitate value authorization and creation. Hence, administrative centrality is present in both public values authorization and creation.

Thus, the management approach of a particular agency may influence the centrality of local agencies in governance networks and the public values process. In short, depending on the dominant paradigm and the predominant external influencers in the management context, the actions of some agencies may emphasize centrality in the *creation* of public value, whereas in other cases, some agencies may maintain a central role in both the *authorization* and *creation* of public values.

The Political Context of Agency Administration

A particular management approach, however, does not occur in a vacuum; but rather, it is embedded in its context. In this article, management contexts are defined as the local political context in which federal programs, such as the CDBG program, are administered. Goetz (1994) identified a number of case studies that provide evidence that development policy at the local level is influenced by its political environment, including local ideologies, electoral factors, and institutional arrangements (Clarke, 1986); the ability of local elites to effectively define the contours of development policy (Stoker, 1987); and the power of community-based groups and organizations in the process (Mayer & Keyes, 2005). Weir's (1999) typology of urban political systems provides a framework for distinguishing between local political contexts in which CDBG program administration takes place. Weir (1999) classifies urban political systems as patronage, elite-dominated, or inclusive. Each is distinguished based on the external influencers that hold power in the system and influence the allocation of public and private sources of support for community development and overall system fragmentation.

For example, in elite-dominated systems, an elite coalition exerts a major influence and community-based groups and organizations have little power and influence. The result is a system that places little emphasis on community development, characterized by a high degree of fragmentation among community-based organizations and limited resources for community

development. Conversely, patronage systems are characterized by large public sectors that offer resources to community-based groups and organizations working in low-income neighborhoods, but these resources are captured by a politically connected set of elite organizations. In these systems, elected officials are a major source of external influence and, as a result, produce a system characterized by fragmentation among community-based organizations, an absence of broad-based coalitions or intermediaries working across neighborhood boundaries, and a heavy reliance on public sector resources to support community development efforts. Finally, in inclusive systems, community-based organizations have independent power, are often viewed as allies with city government, and have a significant influence on the community development agenda. Because community-based organizations have sufficient power in the system, they are not excluded from agendas as is the case in elite-dominated systems, nor are they dependent on patronage relationships. Inclusive systems are characterized by the presence of broad-based coalitions of community-based organizations working across neighborhood or geopolitical boundaries and both public and private sources of support for community development.

Administrative Centrality Through Social Policy Tool Choice

Although the CDBG program requires local administrative agencies to be concerned with values authorization (i.e., what CDBG programs should do) and creation (how to do this effectively and efficiently), it is plausible that the management approach of local agencies responds to the context in which it operates, which yields variation in the tools used to fulfill federal program requirements.

The types of tools agencies use can influence administrative centrality in governance networks. Although there are a number of different conceptualizations of policy tools (see Hood, 2007, for a summary), Salamon's (2002) approach is valuable for the purposes of this article as it provides criteria for categorizing policy tools based on the degree of tool directness and coerciveness. Defined simply as "the instruments or means used to address public problems" (Salamon, 2002, p. 2), policy tools can be more or less direct and more or less coercive, which has implications for administrative centrality in governance networks. Direct tools are those in which the community development agency has primary responsibility for a particular program or service. Tools that are high in directness include insurance, direct loans, economic regulation, provision of public information, and direct government. Moderately direct tools include tax expenditures, contracting, social regulation, labeling, and corrective taxes and charges. Tools that have a low degree of directness include grants, loan guarantees, government-sponsored enterprises, and vouchers, as they allocate resources to nongovernmental actors to create value.

Coercion measures the extent to which a tool restricts individual or group behavior as opposed to merely encouraging or discouraging it (Salamon, 2002). Regulations, both economic and social, are the most coercive tools. Moderately coercive tools include grants-in-aid, loan guarantees, direct loans, and contracting. Tools low in coerciveness include tort liability, provision of public information, and tax expenditures. Through a mixture of direct and coercive tools, community development agencies can maintain a centralized role in governance networks.

It is anticipated, however, that the centrality of local agencies in the public values process will reflect the values embedded in a particular management approach. As a consequence, administrative centrality in the public values process may vary, reinforcing the political context, as elaborated below.

Patronage Systems: Managing by the Traditional Approach

It is anticipated that in management contexts characterized as patronage systems, management approaches will resemble the traditional paradigm. In patronage systems, the formal elected

officials play a primary role in the authorization of public values and have great power and influence over what CDBG priorities and objectives ought to be. Local agencies will emphasize the use of rules and regulations to ensure the creation of public value in line with the values authorized by the political officials and in line with federal rules. It is anticipated that administrative agencies will emphasize the use of direct and coercive policy tools to create public value by maintaining oversight over CDBG grant recipients. This type of management approach emphasizes administrative centrality in public value creation but less in authorization.

Elite-Dominated Systems: New Public Management

In this type of system, it is anticipated that the dominant management approach will emphasize a new public management approach whereby elites and elected officials play a primary role in authorizing public value; however, administrators influence elites through the use of data and information on the efficiency of efforts. The creation of public value relies more extensively on indirect tools that harness the efficiencies of private markets, emphasizing the use of performance metrics to manage the creation of public value and information to steer the authorization process. This type of management approach yields a governance network characterized by administrative centrality in the authorization of public values, aimed at steering the elites in the system, and centrality in the creation of public value through the use of performance metrics.

Inclusive Systems: Public Values Management

In an inclusive system, it is anticipated that the dominant management approach will reflect the public values management approach, as community-based organizations have gained power and participate as equal participants in the authorization of public values alongside elected officials. Local administrative agencies maintain centrality in the authorization process through the use of different mechanisms to incorporate, facilitate, and regulate the involvement of nongovernmental actors. This type of management approach emphasizes indirect policy tools to create public value, coupled with coercive policy tools to maintain centrality in public value creation. Thus, administrative centrality in governance networks is emphasized in both authorization and creation.

Case Study Site Selection

I use a multi-case design, with a maximal variation sampling strategy (Cresswell, 2013). Weir's (1999) typology was used to identify CDBG management contexts that vary based on the political system in which they are embedded. The value of this approach is that it allows one to analyze how management approaches and administrative centrality in governance networks vary in different political contexts. Historical data sources, such as newspaper articles, journal articles, books, and reports by other experts or scholars, are used to identify diverse management contexts for the analysis. A patronage system and an inclusive system are selected for the analysis, as these present the greatest diversity in assumptions.

The patronage system selected for the analysis is St. Louis, Missouri, and the inclusive system is Cleveland, Ohio. Thus, the local administrative agency responsible for CDBG program implementation in each city serves as the unit of analysis. The cities are similar in regard to demographic and socioeconomic conditions, exogenous forces influencing community and economic development challenges such as employment and homeownership, and mayor-council forms of municipal government structure (Casey, 2009). Institutionally, they are located in states with similar banking regulations that may influence the institutional environment for private sector investment in community development initiatives. However, despite socioeconomic and

demographic similarities, the management contexts differ in regard to the political context in which each agency operates and the external influencers that wield power.

Studying the responsible CDBG agency in the City of St. Louis provides an opportunity to understand program administration in a patronage system. As Stein (1991, 2002) and Salisbury (1992) have documented, elected political officials, namely, the alderman, heavily influence community and economic development decisions in St. Louis. There are 28 wards throughout the city and an alderman for each.[1] The Board of Aldermen is the legislative body responsible for the passage of ordinances and the annual budget. Aldermen in the city have been described as practicing "aldermanic courtesy" (Salisbury, 1992) or the code of "mutual noninterference," which means they refuse to approve projects in any other alderman's ward unless that alderman supports it. As Stein (2002) argues, this has the dual effect of "strengthening the aldermanic role while inhibiting citywide planning and the development of projects that span ward boundaries" (p. 98). Even an elite regime of public officials and business elite, Civic Progress, has been unable to diminish aldermanic power. As Stein (2002) describes, the elite regime in St. Louis closed themselves off to the community, keeping discussions and meetings private, working instead with officials at the local and ward level.

Swanstrom (in Rosenbaum, 2013a) explains how an alderman can influence community development decisions in St. Louis. He describes it as a "constant roiling of the community development organizations," explaining that

> When a new alderman was elected, sometimes he or she would cut off a CDC and start a new one, because they didn't control the old one. It might have been connected to their opponent. And so we had constant roiling of the community development organizations. (Rosenbaum, 2013a, n.p.)

Despite a large number of Community Development Corporations (CDCs) in St. Louis, the current community development system resembles an uncoordinated, highly fragmented system. For example, collaboration among community development organizations in St. Louis is rare, but, rather, emphasis is placed on the needs and issues related to individual neighborhoods or communities (Swanstrom & Guenther, 2011). As suggested by Weir's (1999) typology of patronage systems, community development is heavily reliant on public sector funds passed through the city from federal agencies or generated through taxing mechanisms or codes (Bogart, 2003).

Conversely, studying the responsible CDBG agency in the City of Cleveland provides an opportunity to understand program administration in an inclusive system. Due to the close working relationship between the city and community development groups, community development in Cleveland has been described as the "envy of many larger, economically more powerful cities" (Mallach, Levy, & Schiller, 2005, p. 6), and the city and outside players are often described as "one system" (Mayer & Keyes, 2005). Yin (1998) and Walker (2002) both describe community development in Cleveland as the result of efforts from a complex web of partnerships in which CDCs and other nonprofit organizations exert a major influence.

Cleveland's City Council consists of 19 elected officials, each representing one of the 19 wards. Through the 1977s, neighborhood- or ward-based politics were still characteristic of Cleveland, and through the 1990s, the funding for community development was still largely informal (J. Yin, 1998). However, between the 1980s and 1990s, the city of Cleveland saw a shift in power that enabled local government to adopt a structured and centralized approach to supporting neighborhood development (J. Yin, 1998). There were a number of forces that precipitated the shift that occurred during the 1980s and 1990s. The Cleveland Planning Commission's 1975 report, the "Cleveland Policy Planning Report," emphasized the need to address the roots of urban problems, such as poverty and racial segregation, and planners began providing technical assistance and capacity-building efforts to community-based groups and organizations throughout the city (Krumholz & Forester, 1990; J. Yin, 1998). In addition, local foundations

focused on shifting attention away from just organizing and activism to community development (J. Yin, 1998), and city government institutionalized and formalized these efforts. As recognized by Bogart (2003) and Bright (2003), Cleveland seeks to maximize and leverage both public and private resources for community development. In summary, based on Weir's (1999) typology, Cleveland represents an inclusive system, characterized by powerful community-based organizations, broad-based coalitions working across neighborhoods, and public and private resources to support community development.

Data Collection, Analysis, and Interpretation

Data collection and analysis proceed as follows. Administrative reports are reviewed to gather descriptive data on the objectives, processes, and policy tools used in CDBG program administration. Although self-reported administrative data can be viewed as a limitation, as it is produced by the agencies and may disguise discrepancies in individual perceptions, such documents still serve as a source of evidence of the decisions made, shaped and emphasized by the local agency (Riessman, 2008). Administrative reports include each city's published Annual Action Plans, Consolidated Plans, Consolidated Annual Performance and Evaluation Reports (CAPERs), and Integrated Disbursement and Information System (IDIS) data from the HUD, all of which are publicly available either online or via a request to the administrating agency. Agency web sites and communications via email or telephone with local experts, former administrators, and city librarians were utilized for clarification, verification, or to obtain additional materials related to the activities listed in the reports. Consolidated Plans provide data on what the city intends to do for an extended period, and Annual Action Plans detail yearly actions. The Consolidated Plans cover a 5-year period, from 2005 to 2010. IDIS data include post award data on the allocations made and are used to verify if the priorities espoused in the CAPER match the actual award allocations.

Local administrative agencies are required to report in the CAPER on the public participation, decision-making and monitoring processes used to manage the CDBG program, the programs and the organizations receiving CDBG allocations, and key institutional partners. Specific sections of the CAPERs selected for the analysis include those that document agency monitoring activities, public participation and decision-making processes, institutional partnerships, allocation amounts, grantees, and activities. Each CAPER covers a 4-year window of activity. Additional materials such as newspaper clippings and other publications of agency outreach obtained from local city libraries are also analyzed.

CAPER administrative data are reviewed to produce a descriptive account of local administrative actions related to two distinct stages of the public values process: authorization and creation. Data on CDBG allocations, policy tools and programs, and monitoring activities are reviewed to analyze administrative centrality in the creation process. The 2009 CAPER is selected for the analysis and includes data on the amount of CDBG allocations and the type of organization and program receiving a grant for the previous 4-year period, 2005-2009.[2] Allocations for the 4-year period are averaged to describe to whom CDBG allocations[3] are made, and IDIS data from 2005 to 2009 are averaged to describe program activities and priorities, and validate the priorities espoused in the CAPERs.

An interpretive, narrative approach is used for data analysis and interpretation. As argued by Bevir and Rhodes (2003), an interpretive, narrative approach can illuminate important holistic differences across cases.[4] Although a number of narrative and interpretive techniques exist, a pattern-matching strategy is adopted for this analysis (R. Yin, 2014). In this case, self-reported agency data, that is, "program facts" as espoused by each agency and supporting materials are analyzed and interpreted in respect to the anticipated theoretical relationships. Although the use of preestablished theoretical relationships can be viewed as a limitation based on one's

Table 2. Classification Criteria and Anticipated Relationships.

Management context	Patronage system	Elite dominated	Inclusive system
External influencers	Politicians	Senior politicians, managers, private interests	Nongovernmental actors
Management approaches	Traditional management	New public management	Public values management
Public values authorization	Public participation processes that meet federal requirements	Use of efficient means of public participation	Inclusive and facilitative public participation processes
	Political process determines CDBG objectives	Use of public information to educate politicians and citizens	Rules and regulations to govern the participation process
Public Value Creation	Direct tools	Indirect tools	Indirect tools
	Coercive tools to monitor behavior	Performance metrics to monitor behavior	Coercive tools to monitor behavior

Note. CDBG = Community Development Block Grant.

philosophical orientation toward qualitative and narrative approaches, it was deemed appropriate in this analysis given the purpose of the study and its intent to produce a parallel comparison to a priori relationships across diverse cases.

The "Results" section of this article proceeds as follows. First, a description of the processes and actions adopted by each local administrative agency responsible for CDBG administration is presented. The descriptive data are organized based on the processes and actions related to either the authorization or creation stage. The data are then converted to themes based on congruence with administrative actions associated with different management paradigms, using the criteria in Table 2. Finally, themes are interpreted in relation to management paradigms and administrative centrality in the public values process.

Local Responsible Agencies and Funded CDBG Program Activities

The Department of Community Development (CD) is the entity responsible for administration of the CDBG program in Cleveland. The CD's website describes its function as "planning, administering and evaluating HUD funds, and implementing programs designed to conserve and expand the housing stock; revitalize commercial areas; acquire, maintain, and market vacant land; improve the quality of human services; and develop small area or neighborhood strategies." The Community Development Administration (CDA) is the responsible entity for the CDBG program in St. Louis. The CDA's website describes its function as "Administering federal funds for housing, community, and economic development programs that strengthen the City of St. Louis and its neighborhoods."

Figure 1 presents a 4-year average of the percentage of CDBG funds allocated to create value in low and moderate communities in each city. In Cleveland, CDBG funds are primarily targeted toward housing objectives, which parallels the emphasis on housing in both the Consolidated Plan and the CAPER. Between 2005 and 2009, on average, housing programs and development accounted for 50% of the allocations. Public services and administrative and planning purposes account for the next greatest CDBG allocations, 14.8% and 14.3%, respectively. Conversely, in

Figure 1. Percent CDBG allocations to community development activities, average 2005-2009.
Note. CDBG = Community Development Block Grant.

St. Louis, CDBG funds are distributed among a number of different activities, which parallels the diverse priorities listed in St. Louis's 2009 CAPER. Eight major community and development priorities are listed in the CAPER, and IDIS reports from 2005 to 2009 indicate CDBG funding was disbursed to address five of these, with economic development, administration and planning, and housing accounting for the top three, 17%, 18.7%, and 18.3%, respectively. Finally, 11% of the CDBG funds were allocated to build the capacity of nonprofit community development organizations. To summarize, in Cleveland, CDBG resources are primarily concentrated on creating public value through housing initiatives. Conversely, in St. Louis, CDBG resources are more thinly allocated to create public value in a number of areas.

Local Administration of the CDBG Program

Table 3 presents a summary description of the major external influencers, the participation processes, and monitoring techniques emphasized in each case. Predominant themes are discussed below.

The CD, Cleveland, Ohio

Nongovernmental actors as external influencers in authorization and creation. Nongovernmental actors assume a pivotal role in both the authorization and creation stages of the public values process in Cleveland. In addition to partnerships with public sector organizations, such as county, state, or public housing authorities, the CD emphasizes that nonprofit CDCs and private sector organizations are critical components in their community and economic development institutional structure. For example, the city describes its key partnerships and institutional relationships as including

> not only strong working relationships with other government entities (County, State and Public Housing Authority), but also one of the nation's most experienced group of non-profit community development corporations. Other key partners are financial institutions, special needs housing providers and social service organizations. (CAPER, 2009a, p. 30)

Nongovernmental actors such as the Cleveland Foundation, the Cleveland Housing Network (CHN), Neighborhood Progress Inc. (NPI), and Cleveland Tomorrow, a business organization,

Table 3. Descriptive Data of Local CDBG Program Administration by Case.

Category	CD, Cleveland, Ohio	CDA, St. Louis, Missouri
External Influencers	Public sector entities including County, State, and the Public Housing Authority Nonprofit CDCs. Financial institutions, special needs housing providers and social service organizations	Public sector entities including the City's Planning and Urban Design Agency, the building division, the street department, and the board of public service The St. Louis Development Corporation Mayor's Executive Director of Development Division Council and Mayor's Cabinet Alderman
Authorization: Participation processes	Ongoing meetings with Cleveland's network of neighborhood-based CDCs; the Housing Advisory Board; Community Dialogue meetings with citizens Citizen participation surveys Public hearings (3) broadcast on local television Newspaper advertisements Rules and regulations to govern eligibility for CDBG funds Formalized criteria for proposed CDBG projects	Public meetings (2) and public hearings (3) Reports and documents on file for review in local library and CDA office Newspapers advertisements No formalized or transparent criteria for CDBG allocation decisions
Creation: Monitoring processes	CD Compliance Section reviews program activities and expenditures throughout the year Compliance Section Manager oversees the submission of the Annual Action Plan and CAPER	CDA reviews subgrantee's program goals, quantitative program objectives, performance measurements, and budgets Annual compliance monitoring and performance evaluations Bureaucratic oversight from Federal Grants Section of the City's Comptroller's office and the Internal Audit Section

Note. CDBG = Community Development Block Grant; CD = Community Development; CDA = Community Development Administration; CDC = community development corporation; CAPER = Consolidated Annual Performance and Evaluation Report.

are actively engaged in the authorization of public values. The CHN, a partnership of 23 member CDCs; city, county, state, and local government agencies and officials; banks; corporations; foundations; and academic and religious institutions, provides an infrastructure for connecting multiple organizations and sectors to inform community and economic development policy, and to deliver programming and policy objectives. Likewise, NPI works with citizens across neighborhoods to develop a community development vision and negotiates with citizens and the city to build consensus around key objectives (Mallach, 2011).

Nongovernmental actors are also extensively engaged in creating public value. Although a preliminary view of the data from the IDIS reports suggests that the CD allocates less than 1% to their overall CDBG budget to nonprofit organizations and building their capacity, the detailed review of the program data suggests that nonprofit and private organizations play a critical role in carrying out community development objectives. Based on a review of CDBG program data from 2004 to 2008, the city of Cleveland allocated, on average, about US$9,232,749 to public

sector agencies or in-house programs, US$7,710,057 to development projects sponsored by for-profit or nonprofit housing developers (36) through the Housing Trust Program, US$7,462,218 to community development organizations (48, plus an undetermined number indirectly allocated to CDCs through the wards) through the Neighborhood Development Activities (NDA) program and the CDC competitive grant process, and US$4,329,365 to nonprofits providing services throughout the city. In addition, despite direct allocations to nonprofit and for-private organizations, CDBG funds support the Cleveland Action to Support Housing (CASH) program, an average of US$761,130, which pools public and private resources through a nonprofit organization to support development efforts.

Administrative centrality in authorization through public information. The CD adopts a number of different outreach strategies designed to engage both individual citizens and nongovernmental actors in the CDBG decision-making process. As noted in the narrative statements of the 2009 CAPER,

> The work required to shape Cleveland's neighborhood priorities and strategies occurs outside of the specific procedural steps required for the development of the Consolidated Plan and Action Plan. Assessment of Cleveland's housing and development needs and planning for the best use of available resources is an ongoing process. (p. 31)

Examples of these actions include monthly meetings between the Director of Community Development and representatives of Cleveland's network of neighborhood-based CDCs to exchange ideas about current and future programs and policies; meetings between the Director of Community Development, staff, and a Housing Advisory Board composed of representatives of nonprofit and for-profit developers, lenders, real estate brokers, the public housing authority, and interested residents; and community dialogue meetings hosted jointly by elected political officials and administrators with citizens.

Administrative centrality in authorization and creation through rules and regulations. The Compliance Section within the CD is the primary entity responsible for monitoring CDBG programs. Generally, the Compliance Section reviews the program activities and expenditures of grantees throughout the year to assure compliance with federal regulations and oversees submission of the Annual Action Plan and CAPER to assure it complies with the city's comprehensive planning requirements.

However, in addition to reviewing programs to determine compliance with federal regulations, the CD uses rules and regulations to govern the activities of potential CDBG grantees and establishes, and makes transparent, criteria that organizations must meet to be eligible for funding. Rules and regulations are used to ensure that organizations that receive CDBG allocations are representative of the communities in which they operate and that the activities that are proposed support citywide community development objectives. For example, to apply or compete for CDBG funds, applicants are required to have a board of directors that is at least 80% comprised of representatives of the service area's residential, institutional, and economic segments, and 40% representative of the residents of the service area, and the organization must engage in outreach efforts to incorporate public input into program development. The CD uses a formalized, competitive process to award CDBG funds and builds the priorities identified in the authorization stage into the review criteria alongside performance and effectiveness criteria.

The CDA, St. Louis, Missouri

Political officials as major influencers in authorization. Political officials, namely, the alderman in St. Louis, play a pivotal role in authorizing CDBG allocation decisions. Each alderman is awarded

an equal share of CDBG funds for their ward, granting the elected officials power to decide how to invest these dollars in different ward-based projects and organizations. To date, the CDA has not worked with the aldermen to establish a competitive process to award CDBG allocations nor does a process exist by which the public can review decision criteria or the past performance of recipients.

In describing critical institutional partnerships and structures in St. Louis, the CDA emphasizes important relationships with other city departments, including the Planning and Urban Design Agency, the Building Division, the Street Department, and the Board of Public Service, the St. Louis Development Corporation, and participation on several Mayor's committees (CAPER, 2009b). The emphasis placed on critical partnerships with other public sector agencies becomes more apparent given the great reliance on other public sector organizations to carry out CDBG objectives, as discussed below.

Lack of administrative centrality in the authorization process. In accordance with HUD's rules and regulations, the CDA has established a public participation process to engage citizens in the authorization process that adheres to HUD's minimum requirements. For example, in 2009, the CDA made materials available for review in their office and the public library, hosted two public meetings, and held three public hearings to inform citizens of the reports and solicit feedback. Although these efforts may satisfy minimum federal requirements, the CDA documents that its participation process has been less than effective at garnering broad participation from residents or community-based groups in the authorization process. For example, the CDA reports that no citizen feedback comments or questions were received as a result of the process (CAPER, 2009b) and acknowledges a need for improvement.

A CDBG allocation decision-making process that lacks transparency accompanies the suboptimal public participation process adopted by the CDA. The lack of a transparent decision-making process for the authorization of CDBG values and a less than effective public participation process has been a focus of concern among local nongovernmental organizations, and state and federal authorities (Office of the Missouri State Auditor, 2009; Rosenbaum, 2013a, 2013b; U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008). Specifically, the CDA has been cited by HUD for noncompliance with the CDBG program and audited by the state of Missouri for lack of transparency and criteria for CDBG decision making ("City Fails at Spending Transparency," 2013; Office of the Missouri State Auditor, 2009; Rosenbaum, 2013b).

Specific concerns include that the lack of a participative and transparent process has led to a continual funding of the same programs and services, by the same organizations, in the same wards year after year (Office of the Missouri State Auditor, 2009), not necessarily based on effectiveness or efficiency criteria but, in some cases, based on favoritism (Acree, 2013). For example, the former President and CEO of the Regional Housing and Community Development Alliance (Acree, 2013) described how, at the request of organizations in the wards, aldermen used their power to redirect resources from the CDA's budget:

> . . . The CDA was forced to make general across the board cuts to all programs. As a result of this "frozen" system, and the loss of buying power over the years, many organizations would go to aldermen asking for budget "supplements." To accommodate these requests, during the course of the year aldermen would direct that funds be transferred out of CDA's housing development budget and into operating support for community-based development organizations serving areas of their wards.

External coercion from federal and state authorities has forced the CDA to reevaluate the processes used in the authorization stage. In response, the existing citizen participation process is being revised and the CDA has pledged to work with aldermen to formalize CDBG allocation decision criteria (CAPER, 2009b; Office of the Missouri State Auditor, 2009).

Administrative centrality in the creation of public value through direct policy tools. The IDIS data suggest that the CDA allocates a high percentage of funds to nonprofits to build capacity; however, the actual involvement of nongovernmental actors in carrying out CDBG objectives is less prevalent. Nongovernmental actors do receive CDBG support to create public value; however, the amount of these allocations is much lower in comparison with the amount allocated to public agencies. Between 2005 and 2009, on average, about US$16,885,726 was allocated to 26 different public sector agencies or controlled programs, US$2,259,596 was allocated to 26 different CDCs, and US$2,501,217 was allocated to 41 different nonprofits providing specific types of services or training. The public agencies receiving support often leverage CDBG funds with other moderately direct policy tools such as loans or tax credits, which are governed by federal, state, or local rules and regulations, providing centrality in value creation.

For example, CDCs receive CDBG allocations through the Housing Production Program. The CDA maintains a strong central role, as the program uses direct loan support from the city to support the production of housing by nonprofits. Although a grant allocation is made to a nongovernmental actor, CDA staff remain directly involved in the program through involvement in financial feasibility reviews, project financing and loan packaging, site review, architectural design review, and construction inspection.

Administrative centrality through monitoring authorized CDBG allocations. The monitoring activities of the CDA emphasize compliance and monitoring after CDBG allocation decisions are made, relying on rules and regulations to ensure compliance with federal regulations. For example, those nongovernmental actors that are promised CDBG allocations are required to submit to the CDA program goals and quantitative program objectives, performance measurements, and a program budget (CAPER, 2009b). CDA monitoring staff review the program goals and objectives to determine the eligibility, attainability, and compliance with city and CDBG objectives and requirements. The CDA Fiscal Manager and the Federal Grants Section of the City of St. Louis Comptroller's office also review the program budget of potential grantees.

The CDA also places a major emphasis on fiscal accountability and individual project or program performance. To these ends, the CDA adopts monitoring and compliance systems to maintain control over the grantee's use of funds to minimize "the possibility of funding ineligible CDBG activities" (CAPER, 2009b, p. 43), with bureaucratic oversight provided by other city departments. After resources are allocated, CDA program monitors are responsible for performing program compliance monitoring and performance evaluation review. The CDA reviews all programmatic revisions prior to implementation; recipients are required to submit either monthly or quarterly programmatic reports detailing the progress of their program objectives; and during the contract year, program monitors conduct at least one formal monitoring review to ensure compliance with HUD regulations and evaluate performance in relation to the objectives outlined in the grantees contract. The Internal Audit Section of the City of the St. Louis Comptroller's Office performs an annual fiscal monitoring review to determine and verify compliance with fiscal procedures established by the CDA.

Management Paradigms and Administrative Centrality in the Public Values Process

In this section, the themes that emerge are interpreted and implications discussed. Table 4 summarizes these relationships. The narrative that emerges is that administrative centrality in the public values process varies based on the political context. Specifically, the themes diverge in regard to administrative centrality in the authorization process. In a political context characteristic of an inclusive system, the management approach adopted to administer the CDBG program

Table 4. Interpretation: Administrative Centrality in the Public Values Process.

Management context	Management approach	Administrative centrality
Inclusive system	**Public values**	**Authorization**
Nongovernmental actors major external influencers	Emphasis on importance of nongovernmental actors in the CDBG process	Regulations governing the authorization process
Housing as primary development objective	Use of multiple mechanisms such as rules, regulations, and competitive criteria to govern CDBG decisions	Regulations governing an organization's eligibility for program participation
		Direct administrative involvement through public information provision
	Emphasis on compliance with federal rules and regulations and local development criteria	Creation
		Monitoring in accordance with federal rules and regulations and local development criteria
Patronage system	**Traditional**	**Creation**
Aldermen major external influencers	Public participation process that meet minimal federal requirements	Use of direct and coercive policy tools to create public value
Multiple development priorities	Deference to elected officials for allocation decisions	Use of highly coercive tools, such as rules and regulations, in the CDBG monitoring process
	Emphasis on compliance with federal rules and regulations	Emphasis on fiscal monitoring in accordance with federal rules

Note. CDBG = Community Development Block Grant.

best resembles a public values management approach and administrative centrality is emphasized in both stages of the public values process. Conversely, in a patronage system, the management approach best resembles a traditional approach that emphasizes administrative centrality in public value creation.

In the case of St. Louis, the management approach resembles a traditional approach. The traditional approach places value on administrative agencies using rules and regulations to ensure public value is created in line with the public interest. However, in traditional approaches, it is assumed that the procedural democratic process ensures accountability of the public interest, and thus, lies outside the responsibility of the public agency. Authorization to act is a result of the decisions made in the political arena through the formal political channels. The combined management context and approach produces a governance network where the administrative agency emphasizes centrality over the creation of public value.

In the case of Cleveland, the management approach best represents the public values management approach. A public values management approach emphasizes "bringing the political into the center" of administrative action (Stoker, 2006). A public values management approach emphasizes democratic governance and envisions a role for administrative agencies in building participatory institutions for democracy. Regulations coupled with direct and indirect policy tools are used, not only to ensure the creation of public value but also to govern the authorization of public values to facilitate ongoing dialogue to identify the public interest. In Cleveland, the CD has developed a more robust public participation process than federal rules require, has adopted process to ensure a competitive and transparent decision-making process, and uses rules and regulations to influence the internal governance of participating and powerful nongovernmental actors. Allocations for CDBG program funds and other program funds are made through a competitive, formalized process whereby clear criteria are documented and publicized and built

into the review process. Measures of accountability are built into the daily organization and decision-making practices of the grantees and recipients through the issuance of rules and regulations requiring the inclusion of community residents on boards or in program development processes. This approach produces a governance network where the administrative agency maintains centrality in both the authorization and creation of public values.

The findings support Stoker (2006) who suggests that we might expect to find variation in the dominant management approach in a given context. In this sense, a dominant or new management paradigm does not emerge that replaces one or another, but rather multiple approaches exist. However, the findings also suggest that management approaches may vary and be limited by their political context, which lends support to Benington and Moore's (2011) emphasis on the authorizing environment. In this case, the local context in which decentralized federal programs are enacted matters. An implication for management is that it suggests that the value assumptions embedded in traditional management approaches may influence the creation of public value that is more or less representative of the public interest. The question, if it is "more or less representative of the public interest," is contingent on the local authorizing environment, namely, who holds power and how that power is realized. Specifically, management approaches that emphasize administrative centrality in the creation stage but are embedded in an authorizing environment dominated by patronage relationships may limit public value creation, despite compliance and monitoring efforts.

In Cleveland, the local agency is embedded in an inclusive system, characterized by greater integration and power of nongovernmental actors, and the approach adopted by the local agency largely resembles a public values approach. The actions taken by administrators expand beyond maintaining centrality in the governance networks that create public value to maintaining centrality in the governance networks that facilitate the authorization of public values. As suggested by Hood (2007), as a host of nongovernmental actors that also participate as an organizing or advocacy force become incorporated into the day-to-day administrative tasks through the use of indirect tools, administrators must be concerned with managing these organizations in the political process to ensure that they do not gain power at the expense of other groups in the system.

Conversely, in St. Louis, the local agency is embedded in a patronage system, and the approach adopted by the local agency largely resembles a traditional approach. As a result, administrative concerns are prioritized around maintaining centrality in the governance networks that create public value, by ensuring compliance with program rules and regulations. Conversely, the CDA takes fewer actions to maintain centrality in the governance networks that authorize public values. Put simply, the CDA primarily manages the decisions made by the elected officials and emphasizes the monitoring of the creation of public value within these bounds.

What this means for community development agencies is that although they are responsible for ensuring the work they do creates value in low- and moderate-income communities, they are also responsible for the adoption of processes that ensure that the value created is informed and representative of the long-term interests of the multiple communities they serve. For example, in the case of the public values management approach, rules and regulations are used to embed democratic ideals of representation in the individual organizations that inform community development objectives, and the agency establishes the criteria to steer and target resource allocations toward a citywide community development objective, housing.

Conversely, in traditional management approaches, the procedural notion of democratic governance is paramount and serves to authorize public values. This means that community development agencies that emphasize that the programs and projects funded under the CDBG program meet the federal rules and requirements may fall short in ensuring that the programs and projects funded represent the long-term interest of the communities they serve. Agencies that align with traditional management approaches add centrality and control to the governance network, limiting its power, and can be viewed in a positive light, in line with the stabilizing functions of an ideal bureaucracy (Weber, 1947). However, in a political environment characterized by

patronage politics, the reliance on procedural democracy or formal channels for authorizing what CDBG programs should do may result in outcomes that reproduce patterns of power and inequality. For example, lack of agency involvement "upfront" such as facilitating consensus among diverse community groups or citizens, ensuring that those organizations that inform the decision process are representative of the needs of low- and moderate-income residents across communities, or establishing a process for facilitating consensus toward a targeted set of community development priorities, may in turn, foster the creation of outcomes that reproduce long-run inefficiencies in public value creation and imbalances of power. As exhibited in the case of St. Louis, the patronage relationships are so powerful that, despite efforts to monitor and ensure compliance, it led to federal incompliance and CDBG allocations dispersed thinly across a diversity of neighborhood-based priorities.

To conclude, in decentralized federal programs, administrative centrality in governance networks that inform both stages of the public values process may be necessary to ensure democratic governance and the authentic creation of public value. However, the political context and the dominant approach that characterizes a particular agency may limit the ability for local agencies to adopt such approaches. As evidenced in this case, without intervention from state and federal level officials, it is plausible that the actions of the agency in St. Louis would continue to emphasize administrative centrality in the creation of public value and less so in governance networks that authorize public values.

Limitations and Future Research

Although a qualitative approach allows for a more holistic understanding of governance relationships, it may fall short of the demands of a causal analysis (Berry et al., 2004). Although this is a limitation for those who desire a causal study, the purpose of this article is to better understand how different management approaches influence centrality in public authorization and creation in governance networks rather than the factors that predict centrality. Quantitative methodologies designed to identify predictive relationships would add to the study's generalizability.

Second, this study conceptualizes management approaches from the perspective of the agency rather than the individual perceptions of administrative staff or participants in the community. The analysis rests on the interpretation of the narrative captured through written documentation provided by local agencies, cross-referenced and validated with additional materials. However, future studies that utilize different interpretive techniques, such as participant observation, interviews, or focus groups, can provide a more nuanced understanding of how individuals within a given context interpret administrative centrality in public values authorization and creation. Future research at the level of the individual or organization could reveal potential tensions in the lived experience of the public value process in a given administrative and political context (Souto-Manning, 2012).

Finally, neither of these cases provides an example of an elite-dominated political system or a management approach characterized by new public management. In some ways, there were elements in both cases that were emblematic of new public management, but that could be attributed to the increased use of performance metrics and measures at the federal level that govern many programs. Adding more cases to the ones studied here and including cases representing elite-dominated political systems and new public management approaches will enhance overall validity.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

Funding

Notes

1. The masculine form of alderman and aldermen are used in this case, as this is how it appears in the data.
2. The years covered in a Consolidated Annual Performance and Evaluation Report (CAPER) can vary due to the flexibility each city has in the start and end data of reporting activities. The 2009 St. Louis CAPER covers 2005-2009, and Cleveland's covers 2004-2008.
3. CAPERs may list funds allocated to projects in continuation from a previous reporting cycle; however, these data are not included in this analysis.
4. The author recognizes the value of quantitative network analyses; however, because this article focuses on the actions adopted to manage networks, a qualitative approach was deemed more appropriate.

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